

3 November 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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25X1

3 November 1965

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

### CONTENTS

- [REDACTED]
2. Indonesia: Army's anti-Communist campaign continues. (Page 2)

25X1

- [REDACTED]
4. Dominican Republic: Garcia Godoy's new "package plan" would remove top military and rebel leaders. (Page 5)

25X1


5. Bolivia: Political calm likely to end shortly. (Page 7)

6. Notes: [REDACTED] United Nations. (Page 8)

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt



49355

25X1

Indonesia: The army continues determined to crush the Indonesian Communists while paying lip service to Sukarno's efforts to arrange a political settlement.

In a speech on 30 October, army commander Suharto declared that the army would "unreservedly" respect Sukarno's decision on a political solution. At the same time he obliquely criticized Sukarno by stating that a "gloomy social-economic atmosphere" had contributed to the current unrest.

Suharto also claimed that the evidence now shows that the PKI was the "director or stage manager" of the 30 September movement. This is the first public statement by the army directly accusing the PKI of being responsible for the coup attempt.

[Brigadier General Sukendro, ordered out of the country by President Sukarno on a three-month rice purchasing mission, recently stated that the army does not desire a settlement which might produce a reconstituted "national" Communist party. The army prefers the present situation, in which it can continue its suppression of Indonesian Communists.]

[Sukendro indicated that the army is concerned about its ability to cope with PKI opposition in eastern and central Java and, to a lesser extent, in northern Sumatra. The army is now attempting to train and arm at least four battalions of its Moslem and other anti-Communist supporters in eastern and central Java in order to bolster its position.]

[Anti-Communist and anti-Chinese actions are continuing throughout northern Sumatra. A number of clashes have been reported between anti-Communists and concentrations of armed PKI cadres. ]


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3 Nov 65

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
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
An army-inspired demonstration was held yesterday at the Chinese Communist consulate in Medan, the capital of North Sumatra. After presenting the consulate with a petition protesting alleged Chinese support for the 30 September movement, the crowd, estimated at 100,000 persons, tore down the Chinese flag and consular shield. The demonstrators also demanded the ouster of Foreign Minister Subandrio and North Sumatra's pro-Communist governor.

25X1



3 Nov 65

3



25X1

25X1

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Dominican Republic: [President Garcia Godoy has opened discussions with the military chiefs about his "package plan" to remove top military and rebel leaders from the country, but almost certainly will not meet his 3 November deadline]

25X1

[Garcia Godoy's recent conversations with the military chiefs may have led them to believe that they would not be removed at this time, thus creating the danger that they now will feel double-crossed. The President was concerned to find a way of winning their cooperation in their own dismissal, and approaching them through Jiminez probably is the best avenue open to him. According to the US Embassy, the service chiefs will be asked to recommend their own replacements.]

[If Garcia Godoy succeeds in implementing this "package," he will significantly reduce tension in the country and lessen the threat to the provisional government posed by the military. The removal of the

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
3 Nov 65

5

25X1

service chiefs should lessen popular distrust of the military--one of the chief reasons the President has been reluctant to use the regular security forces to collect arms and restore order. The other half of the package would reduce leftist influence on the President and in his government, and give Garcia Godoy a fresh opportunity to display leadership.

25X1



3 Nov 65

6



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\*Bolivia: [The relative calm that has characterized the Bolivian political scene the past month is likely to end shortly.]

[For weeks pressure has been mounting for the junta to announce a timetable for a return to civilian constitutional rule. Most political and military leaders expect such an announcement on 4 November, the anniversary of the junta's accession to power. A decision on the question, however, apparently has not been made because of differing opinions within the junta.]

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[Any prolonged delay in the announcement could bring protests, perhaps even violent demonstrations by political parties, students, and labor organizations.]

[Under such conditions of indecision, and apparent dissension in the junta, a precipitous act on the part of Barrientos to free himself from the political morass cannot be discounted.]

25X1

3 Nov 65

7

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NOTES

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United Nations: [The US Mission believes that sponsors of this year's resolution on Chinese representation may succeed in getting separate votes on Taiwan's exclusion and Peking's admission, in which case the part of the resolution inviting Peking to UN membership could get "a good majority." A low-ranking member of the Rumanian delegation reports that he expects the resolution will call simply for the seating of Peking but not for Taiwan's expulsion. Although such a resolution would probably not receive the necessary two-thirds vote under the "important question" ruling, it could very well get a majority. Any such procedural maneuvers might cut into the votes against Communist China's admission, but in any case Peking undoubtedly would not accept membership while Taiwan is still represented.]

25X1

3 Nov 65

8

25X1

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